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Revising Shonenho: A Call- to a
Reform That Makes the Already
Effective Japanese Juvenile System
Even More Effective
AnSTRACT

Shonenho, the Japanese Juvenile Law, is based on
ideas of protection, love, and tolerance towards the juvenile
offender. Its main purpose is to protect him from the stigma
of the crime or delinquent act that he has committed, as well
asfrom the environment in which he was when he committed
the crime or delinquent act. Punishment does not have a role
within the Japanese juvenile system. Rather, Shonenho
strives to reform the juvenile so that he can return to society
as a fully functional member within a relatively short period
of time. Looking at the low juvenile criminal and recidivism
rates in Japancompared to other industrial nations, as well
as the fact that the incidence ofjuvenile crime has decreased
compared to when Shonenho was enacted in 1949, it is clear
that Shonenho hasproven effective.
Nevertheless, especially since the Kobe case in 1997
involving a juvenile who committed two murders and
assaulted others, Japan has been contemplating revising
Shonenho so that harsher penalties can be imposed on
juvenile offenders. Such proposalshave resultedfrom sharp
criticism towards the current system that some people claim
overprotects juvenile offenders. The two main proposals,
introduced to the Japanese government by the leading
political party, include allowing prosecutors to try juveniles
and having a three-judge panel hear juvenile cases. The
Japanese Diet will consider these proposals in the near
future.
The proposals directly contravene the purpose of
Shonenho. Hence, they do not have the best interest of the
juvenile offender in mind. Despite the respectable track
record of Shonenho, in the wake of the Kobe case lawmakers
have been influenced much by the public outrage over
several uniquely heinousjuvenile crimes.
The focus of a reform that would truly improve the
already effective system should be on enforcing Shonenho.
One way to do this is to add enforcement provisions to
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Shonenho. As it stands now, Shonenho does not provide
any legal recoursefor the violation of provisions designed to
protect the juvenile offender. In addition, lawmakers should
place more of an emphasis on ensuring that Shonenho
complies with internationalstandards of juvenile justice by
guaranteeing juveniles certain rights when they proceed
through the juvenile justice system.
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REFORMNG THE JAPANESE JUVENILE LAW

I. INTRODUCTION

A fourteen-year-old commits a murder.
What is the juvenile's name? What does he look like? Where
does he go to school?
The press and media would answer such questions almost
immediately should such an incident occur in the United States.
In many situations in the United States, the juvenile would be
tried as an adult.' The more sensational and shocking the crime,
the more likely the public would know and remember the juvenile
offender's face and name.
In Japan, however, the story is much different. A provision
in Shonenho, the Japanese Juvenile Law, explicitly forbids the
publishing of any information about the juvenile offender that
could possibly lead to disclosure of his identity. 2 The purpose of
the law is that the rehabilitation of the juvenile will not be
hindered, and no one in the public will recognize him when he
returns to society.3 The law further forbids the victim's family
any access to information about the juvenile offender. 4 It is not
an option for the prosecutor to have the juvenile tried as an
6
adult. 5 In fact, the prosecutor is not a part of the juvenile's trial.
All of these provisions exist to protect the juvenile offender in a
system that does not make punishment its primary goal, but

1.
For juvenile criminal law cases and materials in the United States, see
generally WALTER WADLINGTON ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM, CASES AND
MATERIALS (1983). For a comparison between the Japanese justice system and
that of other nations including the United States, see DAIIcHI TOKYO BENGOSHIKAI
SHONENHO IINKAI, Q&A SHONENHIKO TO SHONENHO: SHONEN WA "KYOAKUKA"
SHITEIRuKA 39-41 (1998) [hereinafter SHONENHIKO]; TOSHIO SAWANOBORI, SHONENHO

NYUMON 230-40 (1994) [hereinafter SAWANOBORI].
2.
SHONENHO, art. 61, reprinted in HIROKO GoTo, ed., SHONEN HANZAI TO
SHONENHO 213 (1997) [hereinafter GOTO].
3.
See id. art. 1, at 201.
4.

See Kobe Victim's Parents Sue, ASAHI EVENING NEWS, Aug. 27, 1998,

availablein 1998 WL 12789355. The victim's family is not allowed to be present
at the Family Court, where all juvenile criminal proceedings take place. See
SHONENHO, art. 3, reprinted in GOTO, supra note 2, at 201; see also Pain of Kobe
Killings Lingers for Parents of Victims, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Oct. 18, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 14873972. Victims' rights have also been the topic of much
debate, coupled with the call to reform the Japanese Juvenile Law. However, that
topic will not be the subject of this Note, apart from the very brief treatment of it
in infra Part III.B.
5.
See generally SAWANOBORI, supra note 1, at 38-41. For exceptions to
this, see infra Part II.A.
6.
See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 38-4 1.
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rather, reform. 7 Shonenho governs all those under the age of
8
twenty years.
Shonenho has been in effect for over fifty years and has
proven effective, without any significant changes since its
enactment. Nevertheless, the 1997 Kobe Renzoku Jido Sassho
case (Kobe case) has triggered a call for Shonenho's drastic
reform. 9 The heinous nature of the crimes involved in the Kobe
case, combined with sensational press coverage and a
misconception that Shonenho is ineffective, have led to a national
discussion on why the alleged overprotective nature of Shonenho
should be revised.1 0
Indeed on its face, Shonenho appears to focus exclusively on
protecting the juvenile offender, rehabilitating him, and ensuring
that the system does not further corrupt the youthful offender."
This goal is precisely what has been the subject of much
criticism, especially since the Kobe case. 12 It is questionable,
however, if the system has done everything possible to ensure the
protection that Shonenho guarantees. As applied, the Japanese
Juvenile Law may not be living up to its own goal of protecting
the juvenile offender.
Now, three years after the Kobe case, Shonenho continues to
be debated, and the possibility of major revisions is on the
table.13 The leading Japanese political party has suggested two
major ideas for revision, which the Japanese Diet 14 will consider
in the near future: (1) allowing a prosecutor to be a part of the
juvenile trial; and (2) having a panel of three judges, instead of
one, hear the juvenile case. In addition, although not explicitly
suggested as part of the reform, since the Kobe case, the press
and even the courts have violated the guarantees of Shonenho in
protecting the identity of the juvenile offender. Yet, because of a
lack of enforcement provisions in Shonenho, such violations, for
the most part, have gone unpunished. 15

7.
8.

See SHONENHIKO, supra note 1, at 9-12.
SHONENHO, art. 2, reprintedin GoTo, supranote 2, at 201.

9.
See Susumu Yonezawa, Shonenshiho Kaikaku ni MotomerareteiruMono,
JIYUTO SEIGI 108, 112 (Dec. 1998).
10.
See, e.g ...
And Discussions Continue, DAILY YOMIURI, Sept. 8, 1997,
availablein 1997 WL 12801731.
11.

See, e.g., SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 19-20.

12.
See SHONENHO, art. 2, reprinted in GOTO, supranote 2, at 201; see also
Kobe Still Stunned by 1997 Beheading, ASAHI EVENING NEWS, Feb. 10, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7720003.
13.
See, e.g., Shonenho Kaiseian Sohki Seiritsu Mezasu: Usui Housou,
SANKEI SHIMBUN, Feb. 8, 2000, at 1.
14.
The Diet is the equivalent of the U.S. Congress; it is the legislative body
of the Japanese government.
15.

See When the Law is Toothless, ASAHI EVENING NEWS, July 12, 1997,

available in 1997 WL 11414505.
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The current suggestions for revision and blatant violations of
Shonenho pose the danger of losing entirely the vision with which
the Japanese Juvenile Law was enacted in the first place. The
focus of the current revisions has been on how to punish more
effectively, even though that directly contravenes the purpose and
spirit of Shonenho, and how to please and protect the public.
This Note will explain why the current proposals go directly
against the purpose behind Shonenho and why they are not
desirable. This section will also discuss the need for a reform
that will ensure that Shonenho, as it stands, will be more strictly
enforced. Part II will lay out the history and current status of
juvenile crime in Japan. This section will also describe the
Japanese juvenile system, its purpose, and its goals. Part III will
discuss the Kobe case and how it has led to the recent call to
reform Shonenho. It will also describe the Japanese government's
early efforts to revise Shonenho, as well as the current proposals.
Part IV will expose why the proposals will not work. Finally, Part
V will suggest a different kind of reform that is necessary in order
for the full potential and goals of Shonenho to be realized and will
more closely adhere to international standards of juvenile justice.

II. SHONENHO: THE JAPANESE JUVENILE LAW
The protective nature of Shonenho is based on an assumption
that delinquency, as discussed in Shonenho, has two
components. The first component is that which harms others,
and the second is that which harms the juvenile himself. 16 When
the juvenile commits delinquent acts, he often harms others.
Because these acts label the juvenile as "delinquent," and he
subsequently may be shunned by society, there is harm to the
juvenile himself. 17
By putting the juvenile offender through
rehabilitation programs and by taking the juvenile out of
circumstances in which he committed the delinquent acts,
Shonenho seeks to protect the juvenile from the harm and stigma
he put on himself. s Shonenho's goal is to erase the offense
completely, not only from the juvenile's own past, but also from
the mind of the rest of society. 19

16.
17.
18.
19.

See SAWANOBORI, supra note 1, at 4.
Id.
See id
See generally SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 1-55.
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A. The Purpose of Shonenho: Protectingthe Juvenile Offender
Article 1 of Shonenho states the purpose of the Juvenile Law
20
as follows:
This Law is instituted with the purpose of promoting the welfare
and wholesomeness of the juvenile, and for the juvenile who is
delinquent, that his character will be reformed and that his
circumstances would be improved. It is also the purpose of this
Law to outline the special treatment that the juvenile will undergo
21
should he be involved in the committing of adult crimes.
Shonenho, therefore, contains no reference to retribution or
punishment of juvenile offenders. The focus is on reforming the
juvenile. 2 2 The principle of making protection the main focus is
Hogo is translated as "protection" or
known as hogoshugi.23
"care" and "patronage" or "to keep from harm."24 The word hogo
is made up of two characters that mean "maintain," "keep," or
"preserve," and "protect," "guard," "shield," and "defend,"
respectively. 2 5 The first character, for example, is used in the
Juvenile crimes are often
word "nurture" or "upbringing."26
referred to as shonen no hogo fiken, loosely translated as "a crime
that calls for a juvenile's protection." 2 7 The hearing, conducted in
Family Court, and the "penalty" phase of a juvenile crime, are
sometimes collectively referred to as hogo-tetsuzuki, or "the
The punishment
process of protection [of the juvenile]." 28
component is found in the fact that the juvenile is forced to
undergo reform, even if he does not feel it is necessary. 2 9 It is
clear that Shonenho has been designed so that punishment is not
30
the primary focus.
The Japanese Constitution provides that all minors are
These
guaranteed the right to grow, advance, and develop.3 1
rights are said to be implicit in Articles 13, 25, and 26 of the

All translations of Shonenho and other original documents in this Note
20.
are by the author, unless otherwise indicated.
21.
SHONENHO, art. 1, reprintedin GoTo, supranote 2, at 201.
22.
See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 19-25.
23.
See id.
24.
THE NEW CROWN JAPANESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 298-99 (4th ed. 1981).
Id.
"Juvenile correctional institution" is called shonen hogo
25.
kanbetsusho, which again shows the underlying principle of protection of the
juvenile system in Japan. Id.
26.
Another example of a word using such characters is hogosha, which
means "guardian." Literally translated, it means "protector." Translation by the
author.
27.
Translation by the author.
SAWANOBORI, supra note 1, at 38.
28.
29.
See GOTO, supranote 2, at 9.
30.
See id.
31.
See SAWANOBORI, supra note 1, at 29.
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Constitution. 32 Thus, the Japanese government has a duty to
enable and aid the juvenile offender to grow, advance, and
develop, despite his delinquency, 3 3 through the protective nature
of the juvenile system. Shonenho is also based on rights that
international
communities
have
traditionally
guaranteed
34
children.
35
It
The spirit of Shonenho is that of love and tolerance.
presumes that the juvenile will be reformed with appropriate help
and that making mistakes is a necessary step for growth. 36 The
fact that punishment is not one of the main purposes of the
37
juvenile system distinguishes it from the adult criminal system.
Thus, when the Old Shonenho (Kyu-Shonenho) (1923) was revised
and became what we know as the Shonenho today in 1949, one
major change was to move all juvenile proceedings to Family
Court. 38 The reason for this change is based on the presumption
that juvenile crimes are in some way related to problems within
the juvenile's home or family. 3 9 Furthermore, the move to Family

32.
See id.; see also KENPO, arts. 13, 25, 26, reprinted in BAsic JAPANESE
LAws 6, 8 (HIROSHI ODA, ed., 1997). The translation here is the official translation,
and therefore, no attempt has been made to revise it. Articles 13, 25, and 26
provide as follows:
Article 13:
All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extend that it does
not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in
legislation and in other governmental affairs.
Article 25:
1.
All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum
standards of wholesome and cultured living.
2. In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the
promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public
health.
Article 26:
1. All people shall have the right to receive an equal education
correspondent to their ability, as provided by law.
2. All people shall be obligated to have all boys and girls under their
protection receive ordinary education as provided for by law. Such
compulsory education shall be free.
Id. at 6, 8.
33.
See SAWANOBORI, supra note 1, at 29.
34.
See SHONEN KEIsATsU KATSUDO TO KODOMO NO JINKEN: KODOMO NO
KENZEN NA SEICHOU 0 NEGATrE 86 (Nihonbengoshirengokai, ed., 1998) [hereinafter
KODOMO NO JINKENJ; see infra Part V.C.
35.
KODOMO NO JINKEN, supranote 34, at 86.
36.
See id.
37.
See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 29.
38.
See id.
39.
See id.
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Court held a symbolic significance, creating an entirely different
40
system from that which deals with adult crimes.
Article 61 exemplifies the protective policy of Shonenho. It
forbids the publication of any information that may lead to the
identification of the juvenile offender. 4 1 It prevents the juvenile
from being identified after he has been rehabilitated. 42 Article 61
provides:
The name, age, occupation, address, physical features, and any
other information that leads to the identification [of the juvenile]
may not be published in the form of an article or a photograph in a
newspaper or other publication, for any juvenile who goes through
43
a Family Court proceeding.

Along with Article 61, Article 22 guarantees that the juvenile
offender's identity is protected. Article 22, clause 2, guarantees
that "[tihe juvenile trial is not to be open to the public."" There
are two main reasons for this guarantee. First, it allows the
Family Court to understand what kind of "help" the juvenile
needs in order for him to change or to be removed from the
circumstances that caused him to commit a crime. 45 The Family
Court must extensively and carefully investigate the juvenile's
private information such as his upbringing and details about his
family. 4 6 It would be a violation of the juvenile's privacy to
release such information to the public. 4 7 Second, once the
juvenile is rehabilitated, and when he attempts to return to
society-at-large, it would be against the spirit of Shonenho to have
him suffer then because of a mistake of his youth. 48 This second
reason is strongly related to the purpose underlying Article 61,
49
which protects the juvenile's privacy from the press.

40.
See id.
41.
See SHONENHO, art. 61, reprintedin GoTo, supra note 2, at 213.
42.
See GOTO, supranote 2, at 128-29.
43.
SHONENHO, art. 61, reprinted in GoTo, supra note 2, at 213. A major
weakness with this particular provision is that there is no penalty provision to
ensure compliance. See When the Law is Toothless, supranote 15, at 1; infra Part
V.A.
44.
SHONENHO, art. 22, reprintedin GOTO, supranote 2, at 205. The trial is
closed to the public, which means that the victim's family cannot attend. See Pain
of Kobe Killings Lingers for Parents of Victims, supra note 4, at 1. But see infra
Part V.B.
45.
GOTo, supranote 2, at 128-19.
46.
See id. at 128.
47.
See id.
48.
See id. at 129.
49.
Especially after the recent Kobe case, the fact that even the victim's
family cannot attend the hearing has been the subject of much criticism. See,
e.g., Editoria: Amending the Juvenile Law, MAINIcHI DAILY NEws, Jan. 15, 1999,
availablein 1999 WL 7538124; Pain of Kobe Killings Lingerfor Parentsof Victims,
supra note 4.
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B. The Juvenile CriminalProcess
The purpose of the juvenile criminal process is to understand
50
the reason behind the juvenile's criminal or delinquent acts.
The basic framework of the process begins with the juvenile's
acknowledgment of having committed the crime or delinquent
act.5 1 Then, in the "gentle and amicable" atmosphere of the
Family Court, a discussion between the judge and juvenile will
lead to a quick discovery and understanding of the circumstances
and reasons behind the juvenile's having committed a crime or
52
delinquent act.
1. The Investigation and Trial
After a juvenile is arrested, he is sent to the prosecutor
within forty-eight hours.5 3 Thus, the police are entitled to a
maximum of forty-eight hours in which to conduct all their
questioning before the juvenile is transferred to the prosecutor for
further questioning. 5 4
After the juvenile is transferred, the
prosecutor has twenty-four hours in which to question the
juvenile.
If it is absolutely necessary to conduct additional
questioning and investigating, the prosecutor may request an
extension for ten days. If still more time is absolutely necessary,
he may request a second ten-day extension. 5 5 Article 48 of
6
Shonenho clearly states that unless it is "absolutely necessary,"
the prosecutor must not detain the juvenile for longer than the

50.

See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 38.
51.
See id.
52.
Ensuring Fair Rulings for Minors, DAILY YOMIURI, July 10, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 12845181; see also Akdra Hattori, Hikou Jifitsu no Nintei to
KensatsukanKanyo, 527 HOUGAKU SEMINAA 61, 61 (Nov. 1998).
53.
See GoTo, supranote 2, at 108.
54.
See KODOMO NO JINKEN, supranote 34, at 25.
55.
See id.
56.
Article 48 provides as follows:
1.
2.
3.

The extension [of the period in which the juvenile remains in a
holding cell during which the prosecutor continues the questioning]
must not be granted unless it is absolutely necessary.
If the juvenile is to be held for an extended time, he may be retained
in ajuvenile correctional center.
Even if the offender reaches the age of 20 during the investigation,
clauses 1 and 2 continue to apply.

SHONENHO, art. 48, reprinted in GoTo, supranote 2, at 211.
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twenty-four-hour period, 57 in order to avoid delay of the juvenile's
return to society.5 8
Shonenho's purpose here is to prevent the juvenile from
experiencing excessive pressure from the prosecutor, as well as to
keep to a minimum a situation in which the juvenile is in solitary
confinement. 59 Before a trial begins, the police department sends
60
all of its findings to the Family Court.
The juvenile trial system, or the hearing, is arranged so that
the juvenile offender is given ample opportunity to express his
opinions freely, but those who accused him are not. 6 1 All juvenile
cases are held in front of a single judge. 6 2 A court-appointed
investigator presents the information to the judge. 63 The judge
hears the evidence and other pertinent information and then
makes a decision based on what he has heard. 6 4 The only people
allowed at the hearing are the juvenile, the judge, the courtappointed investigator, the guardian, and in some cases, the
chaperon as well. 65 The prosecutor is not allowed to attend the
hearing. 6 6 These rules create a system in which all participants
are on the "same side," working toward the same goals-to ensure
67
a "gentle and amicable" atmosphere and to protect the juvenile.
In an ordinary parent-child relationship, if the child does
something "bad," the parent asks him first what he has done and
confirms what the "bad" act was. 68 Then, the parent asks him
why he committed such an act in order to understand the child's
emotions and intent behind the act. 6 9 So it is with the juvenile
trial-the judge acts firmly when he confirms the facts and then

57.

See KODOMO NO JINKEN, supra note 34, at 25.

58.
See id. Unfortunately, however, the short time limits placed on the
police often lead them to use coercive tactics, and in some cases, even violence, in
an attempt to get the juvenile to confess. See infra Part V.B.
59.
See GOTO, supra note 2, at 109.
60.
See Kobe Case Tests Public Patience with Law, DAILY YOMIURI, Sept. 8,
1997, available in 1997 WL 12801730.
61.
See Ideas Sought on Juvenile Trials, ASAHI EVENING NEws, July 10,
1998, available in 1998 WL 12788652.
62.
See Family Court System Put on Trial, DAILY YOMIURI, July 27, 1997,
availablein 1997 WL 12800193.
63.
See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 111-13.
64.
See id.
65.
See GoTo, supra note 2, at 122. Because the prosecutor is not there to
present evidence for the government in a juvenile trial, unlike in an adult criminal
trial, the judge's duty is not to decide which side is more credible. See id. at 12122. Instead, his role is to decide what kind of protection or help the juvenile
needs. See id. at 124. Thus, in some respect, the judge plays the role of both the
prosecutor and the lawyer. See id.
66.
See EnsuringFairRulingsfor Minors, supranote 52.
67.
Id.; see also SHONENHO, arts. 6, 7, reprinted in GOTO, supra note 2, at
202.
68.
Id. at 125.
69.
See id.
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is kind and gentle when he asks about the motives behind the
70
act.
Article 22, clause 1, provides that "[t]he juvenile trial must
have the objective of being conducted in a kind, cordial, and
peaceful way. " 7 1 There are no specific provisions as to how this
objective should be met.7 2
The Family Court can reach one of five possible decisions:
(1) no trial necessary; (2) no decision necessary (fushobun); (3)
requirement of counseling at the Children's Counseling Services;
(4) further investigation by the public prosecutor; and 5) decision
to protect (hogo-shobun)-that is, the juvenile is sent to either
73
reform school or a juvenile correctional institution.
The first possible decision, governed by Article 19, clause 1,
is entered into when a case is closed without an actual trial.7 4
This decision is equivalent to a situation in which a charge is
dropped in an adult criminal trial. If the juvenile is not present at
the trial because of his death or because he is missing, this
decision is also entered. 7 5 It is also possible that his offense is
minor, and thus the court deems that his protection is
unnecessary. 76 In such a situation, depending on the need and
the judge's discretion, the court may nevertheless provide
guidance and advice. 7 7 Shonenho allows the Family Court to
provide guidance to not only the juvenile who has committed a
crime, but also to one whom the court in its judgment believes
might commit a crime in the future.7 8 This option illustrates,
once again, the protective purpose of Shonenho.

70.
See id. at 126.
71.
SHONENHO, art. 22, reprintedin GOTO, supra note 2, at 205.
72.
See id. at 130; see also SAWANOBORI, supra note 1, at 151. A juvenile
case in 1983, the Nagareyamacase, determined that Article 22, clause 1, does not
mean that it is up to the absolute discretion of the judge to determine how to
conduct a trial to achieve that objective. See GOTO, supra note 2, at 131. The
Nagareyamacase involved more than ten juveniles that severely vandalized a high
school in Chiba prefecture. Id. Seven juveniles were arrested. See KODOMO NO
JINKEN, supranote 34, at 40.
73.
See GOTO, supra note 2, at 137.
74.
See SHONENHO, art. 19, reprinted in GOTO, supra note 2, at 205;
SAWANOBORI, supra note 1, at 48.
75.
See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 48.
76.
See id.
77.
Id.
78.
See, e.g., GOTO, supranote 2, at 77. Article 3, clause 3 provides:
[The following juvenile will be subject to judgment by the Family

Court:]
Because
surroundings
or an act that
(1)

of one of the following reasons, his personality or his
make him susceptible to, in the future, committing a crime
goes against the criminal laws:
He is not under the proper supervision of a guardian.
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The second possibility, fushobun, is the equivalent of an
acquittal in an adult criminal case. 79 This category also includes
cases in which the court orders juveniles to be observed by a
court-appointed social worker for a specific time period following
the acquittal. 80
Articles 19 and 20 govern situations in which the court sends
the case back to the public prosecutor. 8 1 There are two reasons
for sending a case back to the prosecutor.8 2 First, the offender
will be sent back to the prosecutor if the court in its discretion
determines that he is actually not a juvenile, that is, if he is older
than twenty years of age.8 3 In that case, he will enter the adult
criminal system.
Second, the case can be sent back to the
prosecutor at the discretion of the court only if the juvenile is over
the age of sixteen, and if he has committed a crime punishable by
the death penalty or imprisonment if it were an adult criminal
case. 8 4 In this situation, the case also enters the adult criminal
system.
The final possibility is that the Family Court will find the
juvenile to be in need of hogo-shobun, the equivalent of a guilty
verdict. Yet the purpose of this decision is not to punish the
juvenile offender, but rather to protect him.8 5
In
1996,
131,786
juveniles
entered
Family
Court
proceedings."6 Of those, approximately ninety percent of juvenile
cases (excluding traffic violations) either did not go to the trial
stage (73.5%) or were acquitted (15.1%).87
Still, Shonenho
requires that all cases be decided in Family Court, before a
judge,8 8 because a juvenile who commits or is involved in an
insignificant incident may nevertheless need a large amount of
help or protection.8 9 Thus, a presumption exists that because a
juvenile is in such a proceeding means that the juvenile is in need

(2)
(3)

He interacts with persons who have a criminal tendency or
those who are immoral, or he frequents indecent places.
He has the tendency of harming the moral character of
himself or others.

SHONENHO, art. 3, cl. 3, reprinted in GoTo, supra note 2, at 201; see also
SAWANOBORI, supra note 1, at 89-92.

79.
See KODOMO NO JINKEN, supranote 34, at 144.
80.
See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 49.
81.
See SHONENHO, arts. 19, 20, reprinted in GoTo, supra note 2, at 205;
SAWANOBORI, supra note 1, at 48-49, 168-74, 200-06.
82.
See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 48-49.
83.
See icL at 48.
84.
See id. at 49.
85.
See infra Part II.B. 1. (providing a detailed discussion of hogo-shobun).
86.
See GOTO, supranote 2, at 136.
87.
See id- at 136-37.
88.
See id. at 137-38.
89.
See id. at 138.
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of a change of circumstance, attitude, or some other factor that
would make him no longer require that extra protection. Looking
at it another way, the mere fact that a juvenile has appeared
before a Family Court does not mean that he is delinquent or a
criminal. 90
The juvenile, the court-appointed attorney, or the guardian
can appeal a decision to the Japanese Supreme Court. 9 1 The
appeal is allowed for any of the following reasons: (1) an illegal
error in the procedure occurred that affected the decision; (2) a
crucial factual error occurred; or (3) the decision entered into
absolutely did not fit the crime. 92 The appeal must occur within
93
two weeks of the day after the decision of the Family Court.
trial, is not allowed
The prosecutor, who is not part of the juvenile
94
to appeal a decision by the Family Court.
2. The "Penalty" Phase
If it is determined that a juvenile needs to be in protectionthat is, found guilty-he will be: (1) placed under hogo kansatsu
or "protective observation"; (2) placed in a fido jiritsu shien
shisetsu, a type of reform school; or (3) sent to a correctional
institution. 95 The purpose of each of these options is to reform or
rehabilitate the juvenile. 96 When a juvenile is placed under hogo
While he
kansatsu, he immediately returns to society. 9 7
continues with his ordinary life, the juvenile receives guidance
from a court-appointed hogo-shi, or "protector," who usually
meets with the juvenile bi-weekly and counsels him. 98 There are

See id.
90.
91.
See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 52.
92.
See id.
See id.; see also SHONENHO, art. 35, reprinted in GOTO, supra note 2, at
93.
208-09. Article 35 provides as follows:
For a decision [of the Family Court] to be overturned, there must have been
a violation of the Constitution, a misinterpretation of the Constitution, or
the Supreme Court or an appellate level court must reach a decision
contrary [to the Family Court's decision]. An appeal can be brought before

the Supreme Court by the juvenile, the court-appointed lawyer, or the
guardian within two weeks [of the Family Court's decision]. However, the

guardian may not appeal if it is contrary to the intent of the guardian[parents] that appointed the guardian.
SHONENHO, art. 36, reprintedin GOTO, supra note 2, at 208-09.
See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 52.
94.

95.

96.
97.

GOTO, supranote 2, at 140-43.
See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 49.
See SHONENHO, art. 24, reprinted in GOTO, supra note 2, at 205; GOTO,

supranote 2, at 140.
See GOTO, supra note 2, at 140.
98.

752

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:739

two types of goals in this arrangement. 9 9 The first is the general
goal of helping the juvenile follow the rules of society and
everyday living. I° ° The second is an individualized goal, such as
trying to control anger, for example, for a juvenile who committed
an assault.' 0
Jido firitsu shien shisetsu under the second option literally
means "a facility in which the child is supported while he learns
A social worker lives with the
to become independent." 0 2
juvenile within the facility.' 0 3 The facility is an open one, with
little sense of institutionalization.' 0 4 In 1996, only 0.1% of the
juveniles processed through the Family Court system were sent to
such a facility.' 0 5
Under the third option, there are four types of juvenile
correctional institutions: elementary level, middle level, special
type, and medical.' 0 6
The purpose of each correctional
institution is to reform the juvenile, and each provides instruction
on everyday living, education, job training, and necessary medical
treatment.1 0 7 Programs at these institutions are designed so that
10 8
the juvenile can become fully equipped to return to society.
Job training is geared toward enabling the juvenile to achieve
some sort of qualification or certificate, such as specialized
computer skills or a driver's license.' 0 9 The skills should enable
the juvenile to be ready to find a job immediately after he leaves
the facility." 0 For those who have not yet completed compulsory
education, equivalent education is provided within the facility,
and the juvenile will receive a diploma from the school that he
attended before entering the facility."' In some situations, the
homeroom teacher or principal from the juvenile's old school
actually presents him the diploma at the training facility." 2 The
goal is to ensure that the juvenile does not suffer a disadvantage

99.
100.
101.
102.

See id. at 141-42.
See id.
See id at 142.
See GOTO, supranote 2, at 140-43.

103.

See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 178.

104. See id.
105. See GoTo, supranote 2, at 136. In general, the percentage ofjuveniles
that get sent to the jidojiritsushien shisetsu remains around 0.1% every year. See
id.
106.
See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 49.
107. See id. at 178. As of March 31, 1996, there were are total of 54
juvenile correctional facilities in Japan. See GOTO, supranote 2, at 142.
108. See id. at 146.
109. See id. at 146-47.
110. See id. at 147.
111.
See id.; see also Kobe Killer Student Graduatesfrom JuniorHigh, JAPAN
ECON. NEWSIRE, Mar. 13, 1998, available in WESTLAW, Japannews Library, Jwire

File; infra Part I.C.
112. See GOTO, supranote 2, at 147.
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1 13
educationally because of his time at the correctional facility.
Allowing the juvenile to receive a regular middle school diploma
will not
further ensures that his stay at a correctional institution
1 14
be known to others after the juvenile returns to society.
The Family Court judge determines which course of action
his
on
best suits the particular juvenile, depending
The judge also determines what type 1 of
circumstances. 1 15
16
treatment the juvenile should receive in a particular facility.
Thus, the protection or treatment is individualized, depending on
the need. The general rule is not for a judge to impose a sentence
of a number of years, but rather, the juvenile must remain in a
facility until he is deemed reformed and ready to re-enter
society. 1 17 After the Family Court sets a rehabilitation period,
heads of the correctional facilities have the authority to decide
whether to keep the juveniles beyond that period.1 1 s
The elementary level correctional facility is for juveniles
between fourteen and sixteen years of age with no remarkable
physical or mental disability. 119 The middle level is for juveniles
aged sixteen through twenty-three with no remarkable physical or
mental disability. 120 The special facility is for juveniles, generally
over the age of sixteen, with no remarkable physical or mental
disability but with a history of having committed a serious
crime. 12 1 The medical facility is for those between the age of
fourteen and twenty-six with a remarkable physical or mental
disability. 12 2
This system has now been in effect for over fifty years in
Japan. As the following section will demonstrate, statistics on
juvenile crime show that it has been an effective one.

113.

See id.

114.

See id

115.

See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 48.

116. See id.
117. See GOTO, supra note 2, at 143-44.
118. See Hidehisa Watanabe, Effectiveness of Juvenile Detention Limits
Questioned, MAINICHI DAILY NEws, Oct. 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14873985.
119. See GOTO, supra note 2, at 142.
120. See id. at 143. Extending the age limit to 23 was a very recent change
as a result of the public uproar concerning the Kobe case and criticism about the
leniency of Shonenho. See, e.g., Ministry to Allow Juveniles to be Locked Up Until

Age 23, JAPAN EcON. NEWSIRE, Sept. 8, 1997, available in WESTLAW, Japannews
Library, Jwire File. Furthermore, the three-year detention limit has also been
changed, and now the detention period can be extended by more than a year as
well as multiple times, with permission from the head of the jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Ministry Extends Punishment Allowed Under Juvenile Law, DAILY YOMIURI,
Sept. 10, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 12801779; see also Part III.C.
121. See id.
122. See id.; see also SAWANOBORI, supra note 1, at 178. This upper age
limit was also extended recently as a result of the Kobe case. See, e.g., Ministry to
Allow Juveniles to be Locked up Until Age 23, supranote 120.
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C. Juvenile Crime in Japan
In 1949, when Shonenho came into effect, the incidence of
juvenile crime was much higher than it is today. 123 By looking at
this simple fact, it can be deduced that Shonenho has proven
effective during the fifty years since its enactment.
While it is a myth that Japan is an entirely crime-free society,
the juvenile crime rate is low compared to most other
In 1996, juvenile arrests made up
industrialized nations. 12 4
5
roughly half of all crimes.12 Of all juvenile arrests, over seventy
percent were drug-related offenses. 126 About seventeen percent
of juvenile arrests consisted of kyoaku (atrocious) crimes,
including burglary, aggravated assault, rape, murder, and
arson. 12 7 In recent years, the number of juveniles arrested for
kyoaku crimes has made up less than 0.02% of the juvenile
Homicide by juveniles is on the
population in Japan. 12 8
29
Annual
Judicial Statistics Report for
to
the
1
According
decline.
highest level in 1959 with
was
at
its
1996, major juvenile crime
1000
cases per year in 1976,
to
about
declined
8213 incidents,
In 1996, only
and since then has remained at that level.' 3 0
fourteen percent of juvenile crime was committed by juveniles
with prior convictions-a record low.' 3 ' While 1997 statistics
show an increase in juvenile crime, a rise in theft accounts for
most of the increase. 132 The number of juvenile homicides again
decreased, twenty-two fewer compared to the previous year, to a
total of seventy-five in 1997.133

123.

See SHONENHIKO, supra note 1, at 35.

124. The total number of all arrests in Japan, excluding juvenile offenders,
was 190,620 in 1996. See KODOMO NO JINKEN, supra note 34, at 165. In 1994,
the number of murder arrests in the United States was 23,305, compared to 1279
in Japan. See SHONENHIKO, supranote 1, at 44.
See id.; see also SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 14.
125.

126. There were 7601 drug-related juvenile arrests. See KODOMO NO JINKEN,
supra note 34, at 167.
127. Statistics for 1996 are unavailable. See id. at 169.
128. See id. In 1996, for every 1000 juveniles (age 14-19), there were 0.17
arrests of kyoaku crimes. See id. In 1995, for every 1000 juveniles, 0.12 kyoaku
juvenile arrests. See id.
129. See Editorial Juvenile Murder Suspect, MAINICHI DAILY NEws, June 30,
1997, availablein 1997 WL 12114671.
130. See Katsumi Kawakami, Legal Circles Remain CautiousAbout Revising
Juvenile Law, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, July 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL
12115385. The fact that the total number of juvenile crimes has decreased as
much as it has is especially significant in light of the fact that the juvenile
population has approximately doubled between 1959 and 1996. See SAWANOBORI,
supranote 1, at 14.
See Kawakami, supra note 130, at2.
131.
132. See Report Reveals Increase in Juvenile Crime, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 27,
1998, available in1998 WL 12847901.
see also infra Part V.A.
133. See id.;
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When Shonenho was first instituted in 1949, the number of
murders committed by juveniles was 344,134 over three times the
number of juvenile murders in the 1990s. 135 Likewise, for armed
incidences was 2866, at least
robberies, in 1949 the number of
136
1990s.
the
in
number
the
double
In the face of such statistics showing that Shonenho has been
effective, several uniquely heinous crimes, especially the Kobe
case, have prompted the call to reform Shonenho.

III.

THE RECENT CALL TO REFORM SHONENHO AND

THE LDP PROPOSALS

While several cases involving juvenile offenders in the 1990s
have contributed to the sentiment that a revision of the Japanese
Juvenile Law is necessary, it is the Kobe case of 1997 that
directly fueled the current discussions.1 3 7 A state of nationwide
panic followed the arrest of the juvenile in the Kobe case with
everyone blaming everyone else for the occurrence of such a
13 8
heinous crime.

See SHONENHIKO, supranote 1, at 35.
134.
135.
See id.
See id.
136.
137. In 1996, before the Kobe incident, talks had begun between the
Ministry of Justice, the Japanese Supreme Court, and the Japan Federation of
Bar Associations (JFBA) in order to identify some of the problems with the juvenile
system. However, there is no doubt that the Kobe case propelled the discussions
to where they are today. See Yonezawa, supra note 9, at 108.
138. For facts of the case, see infra Part III.A. Based on the theory that a
rise in violence results from violent video games and movies, some cabinet
ministers called for tighter regulations governing access to magazines and
television. See Media Controls Urged Over Crime, AsAHI EVENING NEws, July 2,
1997, available in 1997 WL 11414301. One theory tried to link the 1995 Great
Hanshin Earthquake, which hit Kobe, with the alleged rise in juvenile
delinquency. See Studies Link Kobe Quake With Juvenile Delinquency, DAILY
YOMIURI, Oct. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12803060. Another point of focus
was education. See, e.g., Government Committee Urges 'Education of the Heart,'
DAILY YOMIURI, July 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12252858. This was partly
because the Kobe juvenile had written in the note that he left with his victim's
Key
head that he was "taking revenge . . . on the education system."
Developments of Kobe Case, DAILY YoMIURI, Oct. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL
12802917. In addition, the juvenile had, prior to the killings, shown violent
behavior at school, but the teachers allegedly did not do anything about it. See
Government Committee Urges 'Educationof the Heart,' supra. "Education of the
heart," according to the House of Councilors' Educational Committee, was aimed
at "fostering generosity and moral sensibilities" in students. Id. Referring to
violence in videos and movies, then Education Minister Takashi Kosugi explained
that schools had a responsibility to teach children to pick out good information
from the flood of information that they receive daily. See id.
Educators, however, expressed doubts on whether the Education Ministry's
approach would really decrease juvenile crime or even school violence. See New
Slogans Won't Help Japan'sStudents, DAILY YOMIURI, July 28, 1997, available in

756

VANDERBfLT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 33:739

In the wake of the Kobe case, the Japanese government made
some harried efforts to assemble committees in order to discuss
possible revisions to Shonenho. As a result, there are now two
main proposals for the revision of Shnenho on the table for the
Japanese government to consider in the near future: (1) allowing
prosecutors to be a part of juvenile trials, and (2) having a threejudge panel hear juvenile trials instead of the current single-judge
system.
A. The Kobe Case
On May 24, 1997, in the Suma Ward of the port city of Kobe,
Japan, an eleven-year-old boy, Jun Hase, was reported missing
after leaving home to visit his grandfather in a nearby
Three days later, Jun's severed head was
neighborhood. 139
discovered in front of the main gate of a middle school in Suma
With the head was a note, written by the killer,
Ward. 14°
14 1
Later
expressing his hatred of school and society in general.
the same day the rest of Jun's body was discovered in a wooded
hill not far from the middle school. 14 2 A little over a week later,
the Kobe Shimbun newspaper office received a letter, similar in
content and style as the one found with Jun's head. 143
Immediately after Jun's body was found, an investigator with
the Hyogo police department heard that a teenager living in Suma
Ward had been bullying Jun. 14 4 After the letter arrived at Kobe
Shimbun, police borrowed a stack of compositions written by
students of this teenager's class at middle school so that an

1997 WL 12800226. They were uncertain about whether this type of education, if
it were possible, fell within the scope of a school's responsibility, as opposed to the
home. See id. Fewer than one in ten of a select group of junior high school
teachers thought that schools were responsible for the recent juvenile crimes. See
Schooling Not Behind Violent Youth Crime, Say Teachers, JAPAN EcON. NEWSIRE,
Jan. 22, 1998, availablein WESTLAW, Japannews Library, Jwire File.
The Education Ministry also recommended that schools strengthen ties with
institutions such as police stations and counseling centers. See Schools Urged to
Strengthen Ties With Police, YOMIURI DAILY, Mar. 27, 1998, available in 1998 WL
6591927. These suggestions were made for the purpose of preventing juvenile
delinquency and violence. See id. The Ministry called for schools to realize that
there may be an increasing number of problems that schools are not equipped to
deal with alone, and thus should develop relationships with other institutions that
can help. See id.
139. See Key Developments of Kobe Case, supra note 138.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. In response to these incidents, the Hyogo prefectural police
formed a 160-officer task force to find the killer. See id.
144. See Kobe Murder Still Haunts Community, ASAHI EVENING NEWS, Nov. 26,
1997, availablein 1997 WL 14782395.
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expert could examine the teenager's handwriting along with the
letter. 145 The day after the handwriting analysis was completed,
while the results were inconclusive, police arrested a fourteenyear-old boy, 146 whom the press referred to as "Shonen A" (Boy A)
after the arrest.
The arrest of a fourteen-year-old for the Kobe incident
shocked not only the Suma Ward community but the entire
nation. The suspect's note left with the head, as well as the letter
sent to Kobe Shimbun, indicated that he had committed the
murder in response to his anger toward the Japanese education
system as well as toward society in general. 147 Japan, especially
the Suma Ward, lived in fear for a month while the police looked
for the killer. 148
There had been four separate incidents of
assaults on primary school girls in Suma Ward in February and
March of the same year. 14 9 One of the girls sustained serious
stab wounds, while another was bludgeoned to death by hammer
blows to the head. 150 No arrests had been made during the time
the police were looking for Jun's killer. Shonen A eventually
confessed to committing these assaults and murder as well.151
B. Criticism of Shonenho
The Kobe case triggered a national debate on whether
Investigators and some judges have
Shonenho is effective.
insisted that the "unfair" juvenile trial system should be corrected
in order for the public to maintain confidence in the judicial
system.' 5 2
Many have argued that Shonenho is based on
"exaggerated and outdated assumptions of childish innocence." 15 3

145.

See icd. By June 3, the day before the letter arrived at Kobe Shimbun,

the police had formed a team of nine investigators whose mission was to follow the

teenager. See id.
146.
See Key Developments of Kobe Case, supra note 138.
147.
See Editoria:Juvenile Murder Suspect, supra note 129.
148.
See ic.
149.
See id.
150.
See id.; see also Key Developments of Kobe Case, supra note 138.
151.
See Kobe Murder Still Haunts Community, supranote 144.
152.
Ideas Sought on Juvenile Trials, supra note 6 1.
153.
Legal Loophole, MAINICHI DAILY NEws, Dec. 13, 1998, available in 1998
WL 21773277. These critics point to statistics that allegedly show an increase in
juvenile crime. See Report Reveals Increasein Juvenile Crime, supra note 132. In
1997, although the number of juvenile murders declined from the previous year,
the total number of juvenile crimes increased, primarily due to an increase in
theft. See id. The mass media contributed to much of the sensationalism of the
Kobe case, feeding on the public's high level of interest. An author and panelist at
a symposium entitled "Juvenile Crime and Freedom of Reporting" held in Tokyo
stated that "the media should ask themselves why they attach so much
importance to getting reports out as quickly as possible. Japan's mass media
reported the Kobe incidents (as quickly) as if they were natural disasters." Truth

758

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 33:739

Critics also find it problematic that Shonenho allows the juvenile
to be completely free from his criminal past once he leaves the
correctional facility. 154 Others have argued that "minors are
getting smart," committing crimes because they realize that they
will not be punished severely. 155
Articles 22 and 61, which protect the identity of the juvenile
offender, have been the root of much criticism since the Kobe
case. Some have demanded that they have the right to know the
face and name of the juvenile who commits such a terrible
crime.' 5 6 In fact, since the Kobe case both the press and the
Family Court have issued some publications concerning juvenile
offenders that have violated Articles 22 and 61.157 There has also
been much criticism of the lack of laws protecting the privacy of
the victims' families in such situations.' 5 8 Shonenho has been
criticized as having the tendency to "treat perpetrators as victims
and victims as nuisances."1 5 9 Under the current system, the only
recourse for the victims' families is to bring civil suits against the

Also a Victim in Juvenile Trials, YOMIURI DAILY, June 23, 1998, available in 1998
WL 12844479.
154. See Report Reveals Increase in Juvenile Crime, supra note 132.
According to the White Paper on Crime, in 1997, for the first time in five years, the
majority of crimes were committed by juveniles. See id. Theft, swindling, and
embezzlement accounted for more than 80% of all juvenile crime. See id. The
number of armed robberies rose by 619 from the previous year to 1701 in 1997,
which was the highest number since 1967. See id. As for the number of juvenile
murders in 1997, it declined by 22 from the previous year to a total of 75. See id.
155. Ministry Studies Juvenile Crimes, ASAHI EVENING NEWS, July 25, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 11414810.
156. See, e.g., Magazine Blasted for Killer Report, ASAHI EVENING NEWs, Apr.
17, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 7720996.
157. See supraPart V.B.
158. See 'Victims' Rights Unprotected, DAILY EVENING NEws, Oct. 18, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 12802916. The irony of the situation was that the press
criticized this while at the same time taking advantage of the lack of such laws
and invading the privacy of the victims' families. See, e.g., Kobe Murder Still
Haunts Community, supranote 144. "After [Jun's] murder, a note with the words,
'Please leave us alone' was posted on the door of the Hase residence." Id.
Following the ruling of the Family Court in the Kobe case, Mamoru Hase, the
father of the victim, issued a statement to the press. 'Victims' Rights Unprotected,'
supra. One of the comments he made reflected on the fact that "the human rights
and privacy of criminals were overprotected, while the rights of victims and their
families were not protected at all." Id. The statement also said, "[blecause of
media reports, the privacy and rights of our family were infringed, maling it
impossible to lead a normal life." Id. Kyoko Yamashita, the mother of the 10year-old girl who died from a blow in the head with a hammer caused by Shonen
A, also expressed anger toward the system. See Pain of Kobe Killings Lingers for
Parents of Victims, supra note 4. She said, "[w]e have the right to know the
suspect's motive for killing our daughter." Id.
159.
What About the Victim?, MAINICHI DAILY NEws, Nov. 9, 1997, at 1,
availablein 1997 WL 14874227.
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juvenile offender's family. 160 Protecting victims' rights is certainly
an important issue with which the Japanese legal system must
deal. Nevertheless, it is a separate issue from protecting juvenile
offenders. These issues, however, are not mutually exclusive. Yet
critics of Shonenho have argued that the law needs to impose
harsher penalties on juvenile offenders in order for victims to
16 1
attain their rights.
C. The Government'sEarly Efforts to Revise Shonenho
Immediately following the Kobe incident, various government
Ministries, associations, and scholars formed no less than a
dozen committees and panels for the purpose of reviewing and
revising Shonenho.16 2 Less than a month after Shonen A's arrest,
then Justice Minister Matsuura announced the abolition of the
three-year limit on the detention of juveniles at training
schools. 163 A few months later, the Justice Ministry announced a
new directive allowing juveniles to be detained in correctional
facilities until they turned twenty-three and allowing juveniles
requiring medical treatment to remain until they turned twenty-

160.
In the Kobe case, the parents of the victim filed a civil suit seeking
monetary compensation from Shonen A and his parents. See Parents File Suit
Against Schoolboy Killer of Son, JAPAN EcON. NEwSIRE, Aug. 26, 1998, available in
WESTLAW, Japannews Library, Jwire File. Jun Hase's parents were awarded 104
million yen (approximately $1 million) compensation. See Japanese Teen Killer,
ParentsOrdered to Pay Huge Damagesby Shingo Ito, AGENcE FRANcE-PRESSE, Mar.
11, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 2561745.
161.
See, e.g., SHONENHIKO, supra note 1, at 48-54. The victims and their
families, unlike the general public, do have a legitimate need to know what
happened, or why the juvenile committed the offense. Attending the trial or at
least having some access to information may likely help the victims and their
families come to a sense of closure on an incident. This, however, is an issue that
should remain separate from reforming Shonenho.
162.
See, e.g., Youth TrialReform Urged, ASAHI EVENING NEWS, Jan. 30, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7719788. Less than a week after the arrest of Shonen A,
then Chief Cabinet Secretary, Seiroku Kajiyama, announced that he believed it
was necessary to revise the Juvenile Law. See Kajiyama Wants Juvenile Law
Changed, JAPAN ECON NEWSWIRE, July 1, 1997, available in WESTLAW, Japannews
Library, Jwire File; see also Media Controls Urged Over Crime, supra note 138. A
day later, then Justice Minister Isao Matsuura clearly stated that his Ministry
would continue to protect the rights of juveniles, and that there should not be any
"careless and emotionally charged dismissal of the Juvenile Law." Id. Yet, less
than ten days after that, Matsuura directed Justice Ministry officials to consider
extending the penalty term for juvenile offenders. See Review of Circular on
Juvenile Offenders Ordered, JAPAN ECON. NEWSIRE, July 11, 1997, available in
WESTLAw, Japannews Library, Jwire File.
Up until that point, the longest
confinement of a juvenile offender had been 886 days. See id.
163.
See Minister: Juvenile Law Will Be Reviewed After Kobe Case, YOMIURI
Daily, July 26, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 12800157.
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six. 164 This new regulation became effective immediately and was
16 5
applied to the Kobe juvenile.
D.

The CurrentProposals

Beginning in October 1997, the Japanese ruling political
party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), formed a committee to
discuss the possibility of revising Shonenho.166 The committee
published its recommendations in April 1998 and presented these
proposals (LDP proposals) to the Ministry of Justice in October of
1998.167 Although the committee urged the government to adopt
the proposals immediately, and the LDP has submitted bills
reflecting the proposals to the Diet, they have been put on
hold.168 As of March 2000, the proposals still await discussion
by the Japanese Diet. 169
There are two main parts to the LDP proposals. The first is
to allow prosecutors to participate in juvenile trials, and the
second is to create a panel of three judges, instead of the current
single-judge system, to hear juvenile cases. 170 The two proposals
are recommended and submitted as a package. In addition to
these two options, other proposals and suggestions have been
discussed, including publicizing more information about juvenile
trials and offenders and protecting the rights of victims of juvenile
offenders. 171
1. Allowing Prosecutors to Take Part in Juvenile Trials
The first of the two main proposals is to allow prosecutors to
take part in juvenile trials. 172 This proposal has been the most
controversial among the various suggestions and proposals that
have been made at different stages of the discussions to revise

164. See Ministry to Allow Juveniles to be Locked Up Until Age 23, supra note
120.
165. See id.; see also Ministry Extends Punishment Allowed Under Juvenile
Law, supranote 120.
166. See Zadankai: Hosei Shingikai Tohshin o Megutte, 1152 JURISUTO 8, 9
(Mar. 15, 1999) [hereinafter A PanelDiscussion].
167. Id. See also Gen Tada, Shonen Shinpan ni Okeru GogiseiDounyuron no
Imi: Saibankanga FuerukotodeNani ga Kawarunoka, 334 HOU TO MINSHUSHUGI 16,
16 (Dec. 1998).
168. See, e.g., Diet Opposition Puts Juvenile Law Reforms on Hold, ASAHI
EVENING NEWS, May 10, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 17698739.
169. See, e.g., Shonenho Kaiseian Sohki Seiritsu Mezasu: Usui Hohso, supra
note 13.
170. See, e.g., LDP Panels Approve Juvenile Law Changes, MAINICHi DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 23, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 7538237.
171.
See, e.g., Shonenho KaiseianSohki Seiritsu Mezasu: Usui Hosou, supra
note 13.
172. See, e.g., LDP PanelsApprove Juvenile Law Changes, supranote 170.
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Shonenho.1 73
According to the proposal, prosecutors would
participate in "serious" trials, such as those in which the juvenile
174
denies having committed or being involved in the crime.
Specifically, the proposal is for cases that involve potential
custodial sentences of more than three years. 175 Prosecutors
would also be allowed to appeal a Family Court's decision. 176
One justification for this proposal afforded by the Japanese
Supreme Court, which took part in the discussions and supports
the LDP proposals, is that Family Court judges have had much
difficulty in ascertaining the facts in many of the recent juvenile
trials. 17 7 When this problem arises, the judge must question the
juvenile repeatedly, thus compromising his initial role as the
mediator in the juvenile system. 178 In addition, it is argued that
there is inherent benefit to 9bringing in another party to help
17
establish complicated facts.
The need for a system that can determine facts more
accurately was highlighted with the 1993 Yamagata Matto-shi
case (Yamagata case). 180 A student at a junior high school was
found dead in a rolled-up gymnastics mat at the school
gymnasium. 18 1 The police arrested seven juveniles for the
murder of the student, and six juveniles confessed to the
murder.182 At the juvenile hearings, however, all six juveniles
denied involvement in the murder, claiming that the police
coerced their confessions. 1 83 Although the Family Court ruled
that none of the six juveniles' claims to an alibi were trustworthy,
it nevertheless found just three of them to be in need of protection

173.

See Toshio Sawanobori, Hogo Tetsuzuki ni Okeru Tekisei Tetsuzuki no

Jitsugen" Genten ni Modotte Kensatsukan Kanyo no Zehi o Saikousuru, JIYU To
SEIGI 120, 121 (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter Hogo Tetsuzuki ni Okeru Tekisei Tetsuzuld
no Jitsugen].
174. See Tadashi Sakamaki, Shonen Shinpan Tetsuzuki ni Okeru
Kensatsukan no Chii: Kensatsukan Kanyo Seido ni Tsuite, JURISUTO 57, 57 (Mar.
15, 1999).
175. See Diet OppositionPuts Juvenile Law Reforms on Hold, supranote 168.
176. See Aldra Abe, Hiko Jitsu no Nintei to Kensatsukan Kanyo, 527
HOUGAKU SEMINAA 61, 63 (Nov. 1998).

The Japanese government endorsed this

portion of the bill in March 1999, in spite of the fact that the Japan Federation of
Bar Associations opposed the bill. See Cabinet Approves Bill on Child Trials,
MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Mar. 10, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 7538925.
177. See Sakamald, supra note 174, at 58. The Supreme Court's Formal
Opinion said, "[cjurrently, what needs to be especially focused upon about the
juvenile process is how to deal with serious crimes in which the juvenile is
denying having committed the crime." Hogo Tetsuzuki ni Okeru Tekisei Tetsuzuld
no Jitsugen, supranote 173, at 124.
178. See Sakamaki, supranote 174, at 58.
179. See id.
180. See A Panel Discussion, supranote 166, at 10.
181.

See KODOMO NOJINKEN, supranote 34 at 316.

182.

See GoTo, supranote 2, at 135.

183.

See KODOMO NO JINKEN, supranote 34, at 316.
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for having committed the murder and sent them to the
elementary level correctional facility.' 8 4 The court never made
clear its reasons for releasing three of the six juveniles when it
discredited all of their alibis. i8 5 On appeal, the three juveniles
were eventually found innocent of the crime.' 8 6 To this day it is
not clear how the judge made his decision when all the facts were
not clearly established.
Proponents of the LDP proposal have claimed that the
presence of a prosecutor would enhance fact-finding and avoid
decisionmaking without all the facts, especially in cases such as
the Yamagata case in which the facts are complicated. 187
Through the prosecutor's questioning of juveniles and witnesses,
facts supposedly would be established clearly.18 8
2. Instituting a Three-Judge Panel in Juvenile Trials
The second proposal to change Shonenho is to install a threejudge panel to hear juvenile trials instead of a single judge.' 8 9 In
general, scholars and lawyers alike have accepted this proposal
more widely than the one concerning prosecutors. 190
In fact,
guardians and defense attorneys in juvenile hearings have
requested such an arrangement in the past and were denied.1 9 1
The proposal does not specify what kinds of juvenile hearings
should occur before a three-judge panel, and so it is understood
92
to apply to all juvenile hearings. 1
The main reason for this proposal, just as the first proposal,
is to ensure more accurate fact-finding. 193
In support of this
proposal, one Family Court judge has said that especially with the
rise of sophisticated and complicated juvenile crimes, it will be
beneficial for a panel of judges, by using their experiences and
different viewpoints, to arrive at a decision together. 194 The judge
believed that a panel of judges would contribute to the creation of

184. See id.; see also supra Part il.A.2. The three juveniles continued to
claim their innocence after the hearing and appealed the decision. See KODOMO
NO JINKEN, supranote 34, at 316.
185. SeeA PanelDiscussion, supranote 166, at 10-11.
186. See KODOMO NO JINKEN, supranote 34, at 316.
187. See, e.g., A PanelDiscussion,supra note 166, at 10-11.
188. See, e.g., Sakamalki, supranote 174, at 58.
189. See Tada, supranote 167, at 16.
190. See Hiroshi Sato, Waga Kuni no Shonenshingi to Saiteigogisei no
Dounyu, 1152 JURIsUTO 47, 47 (Mar. 15, 1999); see also Sakamaki, supra note
174, at 65.
191.
See Tada, supranote 167, at 16-17.
192. See Kazuhiro Murakoshi, Housei Shingikai ni Okeru Shingi no Keii,
1152 JURIsUTO 37, 38 (Mar. 15, 1999).
193. See id. at 37.
194. See A Panel Discussion, supranote 166, at 13-14.
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a more accurate and objective fact-finding body. 195 Proponents of
this proposal claim that a multi-judge panel is especially
necessary in cases in which a judge disagrees with the
19 6
recommendation submitted by the court investigator.

IV. Is THIS THE RIGHT KIND

OF REFORM?

The LDP proposals, as well as the general reasons behind the
call to reform Shonenho, have an altogether different purpose
than that of Shonenho. It is questionable whether the purpose,
on which a set of laws that have proven effective for over fifty
years has been built, should be changed so hastily in response to
several high-profile cases. It is also questionable whether the
LDP proposals will bring about the claimed effect, such as
enhanced fact-finding in juvenile trials. Even if they did, the
proposals, if adopted, will bring changes to Shonenho that directly
contravene its purpose. 197
A. A Reform for Whose Benefit?
One troubling fact about the recent call to reform Shonenho
is that its purpose is to appease the public that has been
demanding a change in the law that supposedly "pamper[s] young
wrong-doers." 19 8 As evidenced by the fact that it took no less
than three months to make a change in a set of laws that has
proven effective for half a century, much of the call for reform has
been a knee-jerk reaction to a particularly unique and heinous
crime. Many of the ideas for reform, including the LDP proposals,
do not have the best interest of the juvenile offender in mind.
Shonenho is a set of laws that prioritizes the benefit to the
juvenile offender. Its entire purpose, as articulated in Article 1, is
to reform, help, and protect him. 19 9 One of the major problems
with the LDP proposals is that this purpose has not been
considered. Instead, the proposals make the ultimate goal to
2° °
convict the juvenile offender.
The LDP committee has explicitly admitted that its primary
reason for proposing the allowance of prosecutors in juvenile

195.
196.

See id. at 14.
See id.

197.
The proposals attempt to add changes to the current system without
changing its framework, but that is an impossibility, as the proposals, if adopted,
will change the entire purpose of Shonenho. See id. at 10.
198.
As I See It: Juvenile Delinquents Need Nurturing, Not Jails, MAINICHI
DAILY NEws, Dec. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 21773320.
199.
SeesupraPartlI.
200.
See Sakamald, supra note 174, at 58.
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trials is to improve the system for establishing and confirming the
facts in such trials so that the public can more fully trust the
system. 20 1 Likewise, the reason for instituting a three-judge
panel lies in protecting the public.2 ° 2 According to the proposal,
the police are considered to be those who cooperate with the
judges. 20 3 In this way, the main role of the judges will shift from
the original parents to that of investigators and prosecutors. This
proposal also implies that the panel of judges will become a body
that makes punishment its ultimate goal.
Instituting the LDP proposals may result in the demise of the
entire framework of Shonenho. The Japanese Juvenile Law has
been built on principles of love and tolerance. 2 ° 4 Even in the rare
case in which a juvenile commits a terrible crime, the
presumption that he is in need of "help" remains true-in fact,
the more heinous the crime, the truer it is. Just because a case
is high profile, the need to preserve the carefully crafted system
embodied in Shonenho is not lessened.
B. Why the LDP ProposalsWill Not Work
The decision to prohibit a prosecutor from participating in
juvenile trials was a deliberate one that the framers of Shonenho
reached in order to accomplish its purpose. This is so that
everyone present at a juvenile hearing is on the same side,
working toward a common goal-identifying and understanding
the problems that led to the juvenile having committed the crime
or delinquent act. 20 5 The main goal of the juvenile hearing is to
enable the juvenile, through a gentle and amicable atmosphere, to
come to terms with what he has done and to work out a
protection plan that will reform him. 2 ° Thus, the idea of proving
the guilt of the juvenile is not a part of the system. 20 7 The Family
Court judge is not there to judge the juvenile, but instead to talk
through what the juvenile has done, as a parent might with a
child.2 0 8 A prosecutor should not be part of this process because
his presence would cause the "parent-child" relationship between
the judge and the juvenile to break down. 20 9 The proposal allows
the prosecutor to state the facts as he sees them and to declare

201.

See id.
See Tada, supra note 167, at 17; see also A Panel Discussion, supra
note 166, at 14.
203. See id.
204. See KODOMO NO JINKEN, supranote 34, at 86; see also supraPart II.A.
205. See SAWANOBORI, supranote 1, at 30; see also supra Part II.B.1.
206. See supraPart II.B.1.
207. See SHONENHIKO, supranote 1, at 62.
208. See supraPart II.B.1.
209. See GOTO, supranote 2, at 126.

202.
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his opinions to the judge. 2 10 The addition of a prosecutor will
impose a new dimension to the current system-it will mean that
there will be dialogue, between the judge and another adult, in
which the juvenile will not participate.
As seen in Articles 17 and 48, for example, Shonenho
requires that the juvenile adjudication process be conducted
swiftly. 21 1 This is so that the protection will occur as quickly as
possible after the hearing and so that the juvenile can re-enter
society as soon as possible. 21 2
A prosecutor, however, may
needlessly prolong the hearing by repeated direct and crossexaminations of the juvenile and witnesses in order to prove the
guilt of the juvenile. 21 3 In addition, the proposal would give the
prosecutor the right to appeal a decision, and hence, increase the
2 14
possibility of prolonging the process.
In this way, including a prosecutor in the juvenile trial would
create an adversarial system, instead of one in which everyone is
working toward a common goal. Shonenho never envisioned such
an adversarial system. 215 Further, the presence of a prosecutor
may threaten the amicable and gentle atmosphere. Even under
the current system, attorneys have expressed the difficulty that a
juvenile offender experiences in trying to articulate his thoughts
and feelings during a hearing. 2 16 With a prosecutor present who
may disagree with what the juvenile has to say, it will become
even more difficult to ensure that the juvenile feels free to be
2 17
honest and open about why he committed a certain act.
Proponents of the proposals point to the Yamagata case to
illustrate the need for a system that can more accurately expose
the facts of a case.2 18 While that is true, it is highly questionable
that introducing a prosecutor into the juvenile trial system will
accomplish that goal. In fact, it may deter the discovery of facts.
In the Yamagata case, for example, the juveniles had all
confessed to having committed the crime.2 19
The spirit of
Shonenho requires that the police conduct the interview with a

210.
211.

SeeTada, supranote 167, at 16.
SHONENHO, art. 17, reprintedin GoTo, supra note 2, at 203-04.

212.
SeeTada, supranote 167, at 18.
213.
See id.; see also Yonezawa, supra note 9, at 111.
214.
See id.
215.
See id. at110.
216.
See, e.g., Hiroshi Shimizu, Shonenho Ichijo no Mokuteki to Shissuru
Kaikaku 0, 334 Hou TO MINSHUSHUGI 30, 30 (Dec. 1998). One court investigator
said that, in his experience, most juveniles that go through the system are not
very articulate and have difficulty expressing themselves. Kazuyoshi Takigawa,
Chosakan kara Mita Kaiseiron no Monda4 334 Hou TO MINSHUSHUGI 34, 34-35
(Dec. 1998).
217.
See, e.g., Hattori, supranote 52, at 61-62.
218.
See, e.g., A PanelDiscussion, supranote 166, at 10.
219.
See KODOMO NO JINKEN, supranote 34, at 316.
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suspect in a sensitive manner. 22 0 Further, the short investigation
period described in Article 17 was designed to protect the juvenile
from long periods of isolation in a holding cell. 22 1 In reality,
however, the time limit placed on the investigators has led to their
use of physical violence and verbal threats in an attempt to
obtain a confession from the juvenile, and unfortunately, there
have been numerous juvenile cases in which the police have
employed questionable investigation techniques. 2 2 2 In such a
case, it is doubtful that the juvenile will be able to plead his
innocence and coherently explain that he was coerced into
confession by the police at a hearing in which the prosecutor is
present and questioning him. 22 3 This is true especially in light of
the fact that the sentiment behind the proposal is to "ensure that
22 4
no guilty juvenile goes free."
Fact-finding is obviously a crucial part of the juvenile hearing.
The purpose for discovery, however, is not so that the juvenile can
be proven guilty, as the proponents of the proposals would say, but
rather, so that the judge can devise a proper protection plan for the
juvenile. In order for the judge to work out a proper plan for the
225
juvenile, the judge must have all the facts in front of him.
Considering that the presence of a prosecutor may intimidate the
juvenile and thus hinder the fact-finding process, it would be
perhaps more effective to better train the court-appointed
investigators, who could present all the information to the judge, or
226
to better train the judges themselves.
A three-judge panel will create an effect similar to the presence
of a prosecutor and will likely intimidate the juvenile. The juvenile
hearing will be successful only if there is a true partnership created
between the judge and the juvenile, and the juvenile sees it as such.
In fact, the juvenile's defense lawyer (guardian) is present only in
about one percent of the hearings in order to allow the juvenile to
understand and experience that he and the judge are to work
together as a team.2 2 7 It is less likely that the juvenile will perceive
a partnership between a group of adults and himself, than between
just one judge, acting as a "parent," and himself. This second
element of the proposal is certainly less of a threat than the first in

220.
See generally id. at 27-29.
221.
See SHONENHO, art. 17, reprintedin GOTO, supra note 2, at 203-04.
222.
See KODOMO NO JINKEN, supra note 34, at 24-26; see also infra Part
V.B.
223.
See Yukio Yamashita, Chofu Jiken kara Kangaeru Kaiseiron no
Mondaiten,334 HOu TO MINSHUSHUGI 32, 32 (Dec. 1998).
224.
Tada, supranote 167, at 17.
225.
See supraPart II.B. 1.
226.
See supraPart II.B. 1.
227.
See Hattori, supra note 52, at 62; see also Yonezawa, supra note 9, at
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demolishing the framework of Shonenho, since the key players of the
hearing will remain the same. Still, there is the danger that the
conversation between the juvenile and the judges will not occur, as
the juvenile may feel alienated when he cannot fully understand or
participate in the dialogue between the judges.

V. A CALL FOR A DIFFERENT

KIND OF REFORM

In the midst of all the criticism and emotional debate, that
Shonenho has proven effective for over half a century has been
ignored. In order to bring about reform, lawmakers should make
changes so that Shonenho is more closely followed and enforced.
Reform should make the already effective system even more
effective. Shonenho, as written, makes its goal the protection of
the juvenile offender. This goal, despite the recent criticism,
conforms closely to international standards for children's rights,
and thus a revision of Shonenho must continue to uphold this
purpose. In reality, many of the provisions of Shonenho are
violated, especially because it does not contain enforcement
provisions.
The irony is that the recent emotional reaction to the Kobe
case has called for the reform of the overprotectiveness of
Shonenho when, in reality, the lack of penalty provisions has led
to numerous violations of the protection provisions. 22 8 In order
to realize the full potential of Shonenho, as envisioned by its
founders, reform of Shonenho should focus on how better to apply
and effectuate its provisions.
One of the flaws of the LDP proposals is that they attempt to
change major portions of Shonenho without anticipating the
additional changes that must occur in order for the entire system
to work. 2 2 9 Specifically, the presence of prosecutors in juvenile
trials would cause the system to mimic adult criminal trials. That
shift would mean that juveniles should be guaranteed certain
rights that adults possess. Should the proposals be adopted, the
likelihood is great that the protective element of Shonenho will be
diminished.

228.
See, e.g., Morse Saito, Battling Wmdmills, MAINIcHI DAILY NEWS, Oct. 27,
1997, available in 1997 WL 14874076.
229.
SeeA Panel Discussion, supranote 166, at 10.
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What Has Been Overlooked: Shonenho Has Proven
Effective for Fifty Years

The media frenzy that followed the Kobe case led to
inaccurate reports about juvenile crime in Japan. Although the
total number of crimes committed by minors is on the rise, 2 30 the
number of serious crimes committed by minors has declined
since Shonenho was first enacted in 1949.231 While the 1998
White Paper on crime showed that the number of juveniles
arrested on suspicion of violating juvenile criminal laws in 1997
was up 9.8% from the previous year,2 32 the number of murders
committed by juveniles declined by twenty-two to seventy-five
The number of "shocking" or
between 1996 and 1997.233
the
Kobe incident, is small when
"atrocious" crimes, such as
234
of juvenile criminal activity.
context
broader
the
considered in
Yet the media has repeatedly highlighted that juvenile crime is on
the rise. 23 5 Thus, although "the mass media has done a terrific
job of frightening the public, the scary headlines are not
236
supported by the statistics."
Furthermore, under the current juvenile justice system, the
incidence of juvenile crime is extremely low when compared to
The same is true for the
other industrialized nations. 23 7
recidivism rate 238 for juvenile crime. 23 9 For example, seventeen
of forty teenagers convicted of committing vicious crimes such as

230. See Kaoruko Sunazawa, Does Japan'sJuvenile Law Give Criminals an
Easy Ride?, ASAHI EVENING NEWS, July 23, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 11414758.
231. See Kobe Case Tests PublicPatience With Law, supranote 60.
232. See Reported Crimes in JapanReach Record High in 1997, BERNAMA,
Oct. 13, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 20442155.
233. See Report Reveals Increasein Juvenile Crime, supranote 132.
234. Ensuring Fair Rulings for Minors, supra note 52. Furthermore, the
incidence of juvenile crime in Japan is extremely low compared to that in other
countries, such as the United States. See Sunazawa, supra note 230; see also
Editorial: Amending the Juvenile Law, MAINICHI DAILY NEws, Jan. 15, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 7538124. The United States places less emphasis on
rehabilitation than in Japan, and statistics show that harsher penalties have not
been a deterrent. See id.; see also Kobe Case Tests Public Patience With Law,
supra note 60. In 1998, 257 juveniles were arrested in Japan for serious crimes,
including murder and attempted murder. This figure was the highest since police
began compiling such statistics in 1972. See Japanese Youth Crime on the Rise,
AP ONLINE, Dec. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 25272552. However, the call to
reform Shonenho occurred before the most recent statistics were published.
235. See, e.g., Report Reveals Increase in Juvenile Crime, supra note 132.
236. Crime Stats Show Little Truth Behind the Headlines, MAINICHI DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 24, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 13531938.
237.

See, e.g., SHONENHIKO, supranote 1, at 39-44.

238. The recidivism rate is the rate at which juvenile offenders return as
repeat offenders.
239. See Editoria:Amending the Juvenile Law, supranote 49.
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murder and robbery between 1965 and 1997 became repeat
offenders. 2 40 Most of the seventeen were held responsible for
minor crimes, and only one out of this group was arrested and
indicted for robbery with the use of force, a more serious
crime. 2 4 ' Of the twenty-four juveniles that committed murder in
1996, only two had previously been sent to a juvenile training
2 42
school.
B. Revising Shonenho So That EnforcementProvisionsAre Added
One problematic trend since the Kobe case is that protecting
the privacy of the juvenile offender has been ignored. 2 4 Much of
it is based on the mentality that juveniles who commit terrible
crimes do not deserve such protection. 2 44 In order to preserve
the framework of Shonenho, such violations must be controlled.
Nevertheless, the problem is that there are no enforcement
provisions in Shonenho.245 Shonenho can appear like a series of
apolicy statements" rather than laws. 2 46 Although the text of
Shonenho reflects its policy of protecting the juvenile offender, its
that no legal recourse
lack of enforcement provisions means
24 7
exists when a provision is not upheld.
For example, in the Kobe case, after a total of five hearings,
in an unprecedented move the Family Court issued an official
eight-page summary of the reasons for its decision in the Kobe
case. The summary began as follows:
The Juvenile Law enshrines basic ideas for the protection and
the healthy development of minors. It is of course necessary to not
to do anything to stand in the way of rehabilitating minors.
But the nation should review how it should disclose

See Ministry Studies Juvenile Crimes, supranote 155.
240.
See id.
241.
242.
See id
See, e.g., Yonezawa, supra note 9, at 113.
243.
See, e.g, Hiroshi Murayama, Johou Kokai/Kafit to Shonenjiken: Hanzai
244.
Houdou to Johou Kokai, 334 Hou TO MINSHUSHUGI 24, 24-26 (Dec. 1998); Kenta
Yamada, Shonen no Hogo to Hyogen no Jiyu, 1136 JURISUTO 47, 48 (June 15,

1998).
See, e.g., When the Law is Toothless, supranote 15.
245.
Id. Nineteenth-century German legal jurisprudence scholar, Rudolf
246.
von Jhering noted that "[f]aws that have no accompanying coercion are like a fire
that does not burn." Id.
See id.
247.
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from society,
information on major cases attracting wide attention
248
based on the measure taken by the family court.
While the summary was careful to avoid mentioning details about
the juvenile's upbringing or his psychological background, it
briefly discussed his relationship with his parents and his state of
mind at the time of the crimes. 24 9 Thus, the court gave its stamp
of approval for releasing information on a juvenile trial merely

248. The Family Court's summary, in part, of reasons for its decisions was
as follows:
Protection of Minors
The Juvenile Law enshrines basic ideas for the protection and the
healthy development of minors. It is of course necessary to not to do
anything to stand in the way of rehabilitating minors.
But the nation should review how it should disclose information on
major cases attracting wide attention from society, based on the measure
taken by the family court.
Although their behavior is not as bizarre as in the zeg case, more and
more delinquents are suffering from distorted personalities or personality
disorders.
Medical juvenile training schools differ from ordinary juvenile training
schools in that they are primarily aimed at restoring the mental and
physical health of minors.
It is expected that the Kobe boy will be kept in the facility for a long
time. Because of this, the [F]amily [C]ourt advised the medical juvenile
training school to work with the boy individually, not as part of uniform
treatment for other reformatory residents.
At the same time, the court considered the role of the boy's parents
and asked a probation office to help them assist in the boy's rehabilitation
as family members. For the boy, the support of his family is essential ....
Editorial: Learn Lesson From Kobe Case, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 18, 1997, available in
1997 WL 12802923.

Judge Yasuhiro Igaki of the Family Court said additionally, through court
officials, that the juvenile may suffer from a serious mental disorder in the future,
and that he should undergo treatment at a medical detention facility. See Court
Orders Medical Treatment for Teenage Murderer, JAPAN ECON. NEwsIRE, Oct. 17,
1997, availablein WESTLAW, Japannews Library, Jwire File. The judge explained
that although the juvenile was not currently mentally ill, he was at risk of
schizophrenia, depression, and other kinds of mental illnesses. See id. The
ninety-minute closed-door final hearing was attended by the juvenile, Judge Igaki,
five defense lawyers, court examiners, and the juvenile's parents. See id. The
judge focused on "the mental darkness" which led the juvenile to commit a series
of such atrocious crimes, including a deep-rooted sadistic tendency. See id.; see
also Editorial:Kobe Court Verdict, MAINICHI DAILY NEws, Oct. 19, 1997, available in
1997 WL 14873990. The Family Court also said that it "prayed for the day when
the juvenile could extend a heartfelt apology to the victims and their families." Id.
After the ruling, the juvenile's defense lawyers told the press that he had
apologized in tears to his own mother at an earlier meeting. See Court Orders
Medical Treatmentfor Teenage Murderer,supra.
249. See, e.g., Key Points of Kobe Family Court Ruling, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct.
18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12802920. When announcing its ruling, the
Family Court said that it wanted to promote accuracy in press reports on this
high-profile case, and that the contents did not violate any confidence. See
Defense Lawyers Protest Court Disclosure of Ruling, JAPAN ECON. NEWSIRE, Oct. 22,
1997, availablein WESTLAW, Japannews Library, Jwire File.
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because it "attract[s] wide attention from society," despite being a
violation of Article 22. Since the Kobe case, it has become routine
25 0
for the Family Court to release summaries of juvenile trials.2 5
There is no legal basis or established reason for this practice. '
In fact, it clearly violates, at the very least, the spirit of Shonenho.
Violations of Article 61 also have occurred regularly since the
Kobe case. One magazine publisher published a photograph of
the Kobe juvenile following his arrest, with his eyes blacked out to
conceal his features. 25 2 In a second magazine, it published an
2 53
In both
unaltered photograph along with the suspect's name.
situations, the Justice Ministry requested a recall of the
magazines. 2 5 4 The problem, however, was that the request was
not binding 2 55 because there is no penalty for violating Article 61
of Shonenho.2 5 6 Thus, despite the recall, the publisher insisted
that either it had not violated the law because it had altered the
photograph, or it had violated the law but the suspect had no
2 57
true legal protection.

See Truth Also a Victim in Juvenile Trials, supra note 153. The lawyers
250.
for the Kobe juvenile submitted a. written protest to the Kobe Family Court for
having made its decision public. See Defense Lawyers Protest Court Disclosure of
Ruling, supra note 249. The protest said that "[t]he disclosure went into excessive
detail, against the purpose of the Juvenile Law which requires closed-door trials
(for juveniles)." Id.
See id.
251.
See Teen Killer Responding to Therapist, DAILY YOMIURI, Apr. 22, 1998,
252.
availablein 1998 WL 6592500.
See Use of Suspect's Altered Photo 'Illegal,' ASAHI EVENING NEWS, July 4,
253.
1997, available in 1997 WL 11414351; Ministry Chastises Publisher for Kobe
Suspect Photograph,DAILY YOMIURI, July 5, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 12252497.
See id. This was the first time ever that the Ministry appealed for a
254.
recall of a publication in Japan. See id.; see also Editoria" The Juvenile Act,
MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, July 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12114761. Nichibenren,
The Federation of Bar Associations, as well as the Prime Minister, also denounced
the publisher's decision. Ministry Chastises Publisherfor Kobe Suspect Photograph, supranote 253. The Ministry made clear that its request for the recall was
"intended as a severe criticism of the company's disregard for the law." Id.
See id.
255.
See generally When the Law is Toothless, supra note 15.
256.
See Ministry Chastises Publisherfor Kobe Suspect Photograph, supra
257.
note 253. A large majority of booksellers and kiosks throughout Japan made
independent decisions to pull these magazines from their shelves. See, e.g.,
Kiosks in Kansai Halt Sale of Magazine on Kobe Boy, JAPAN ECON. NEWSIRE, Feb.
12, 1998, available in WESTLAW, Japannews Library, Jwire File.
There was a second violation of Article 61 by the same publisher several
months later, after the juvenile from the Kobe case was sent to a medical juvenile
facility. See, e.g., Magazine Publishes Kobe Boy's Testimony, DAILY YOMIURI, Feb.
11, 1998, availablein 1998 WIL 6591448. It turned out that an ultra-leftist group
based in Tokyo, Kakumaruha, or the Revolutionary Marxist Faction, obtained the
juvenile's depositions and distributed it to the media, including the magazine. The
group broke into the Kobe medical facility, where the victim's autopsy was
performed, and illegally entered the juvenile's home and the facility where the
juvenile was detained to install a wire-tapping device. See Extremist Group Had
Data on Teen Killer, ASAHI EVENING NEWS, Feb. 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL
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Likewise in a 1998 case involving a nineteen-year-old
2 58
juvenile, the same publisher violated Article 61 once again.
The Osaka District Court held that the nineteen-year-old, who
sued the publisher, was entitled to damages. 25 9
On appeal,
however, the Osaka High Court, in March 2000, overturned the
decision and held that it was not illegal to publish the name of
the juvenile offender. 2 60 The court held that Article 61 did not
confer a right to privacy upon the juvenile offender. 2 6 1 It held
that instead, the provision "served the purpose of enabling the
juvenile's return to society and preventing him from becoming a
repeat offender." 26 2 The court further held that "[e]ven if Article
61 gives [the juvenile] the right to privacy, it should not
263
It
necessarily preempt the freedom of expression [and press]."
gave two reasons for this conclusion: (1) the serious and heinous
nature of the crime justified the public's interest in knowing what
kind of person committed it; and (2) it is unclear how the

7720284; see also Leftist Arrested for Theft of Kobe Killer Statements, MAINICHI
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 15, 1999, available in 1999 WL 7538133.

The magazine

published the testimony of the Kobe juvenile that he gave to public prosecutors
concerning the murders. See Extremist Group HadData on Teen Killer, supra. The
head of the Kobe Family Court telephoned the editor-in-chief of the magazine that
carried the testimony before the magazine was distributed and urged him to drop
the article containing the testimony or to stop sending the magazine out. See id.
The Supreme Court also issued a written protest against the publisher. See
Supreme Court Blasts Publisher on Kobe Boy's Statements, JAPAN ECON. NEwSIRE,
Feb. 10, 1998, available in WESTLAW, Japannews Library, Jwire File. Then
Education Minister Nobutaka Machimura said that some disclosure of information
in juvenile crime cases is necessary "to prevent meaningless confusion at schools."
Minister Favors Release of Some Juvenile Crime Info, JAPAN ECON. NEWSIRE, Feb.
16, 1998, available in WESTLAW, Japannews Library, Jwire File.
However,
Machimura clearly stated that the publisher exceeded the limit of disclosure
necessary, although he refrained from specifying a limit. Id.

258. The magazine printed a story and photo of a nineteen-year-old paint
thinner addict accused of stabbing a five-year-old to death. See Monthly Flouts
Law on Child-Killer,ASAHI EVENING NEWS, Feb. 18, 1998, available in 1998 WL
7720202.
259.

See Murayama, supra note 244, at 24; Osaka Awards Damages to

Murderer,MAINICHI DAILY NEws, June 11, 1999, available in 1999 WL 18397435.
The juvenile sought 22 million yen (approximately $190,000) in damages, and the
Osaka District Court ordered the publisher to pay him 2.5 million yen

(approximately $20,000).

See Osaka Awards Damages to Murderer, supra. In

spite of this ruling, however, Judge Michiyo Miyokawa held that using a minor's
name would "not necessarily constitute an unlawful act." Victim Forgotten in

ProtectingPrivacy,DAILY YOMIURI, June 24, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17755026.
260. Jyukyusai Hikoku no JitsumeriShashinKeisai: Shinchosha ga Gyakuten
Shoso, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 1, 2000.
261.
262.

See id.
Id.

263. Sakai Torima Satsujin Jukyusai Kagaisha no Jitsumei Houdoude
Shinchosha ga Gyakuten Shoso, MANICHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 1, 2000.
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publication of the juvenile's name specifically interferes with his
2 4
rehabilitation. 6
Thus, the Osaka High Court did not specify that its holding
was a narrow one. One can speculate that the age of the juvenile
when he committed the crime (nineteen) and that his case was
decided in the adult criminal system 26 5 influenced the court.
Nevertheless, because the court neither specified nor alluded to
any of these factors, it has left open the possibility that its ruling
can apply to any juvenile, regardless of age, whose Article 61
2 66
rights are violated.
The provisions of Shonenho concerning the investigation
stage present special problems in terms of enforcement. 2 6 7 These
problems exist because the particular provisions related to the
investigation stage, Articles 8, 41, and 42, do not at all stipulate
how the investigation should be conducted. 2 68
Nevertheless,
Article 1, the purpose provision, clearly states that all the
provisions of Shonenho should work toward the goal of protecting
the juvenile "for the purpose of promoting the welfare and
26 9
wholesomeness of the juvenile."
Again, evidence shows that police and investigators have
repeatedly violated Article 1.270 Because of the lack of penalty
provisions-apart from token reprimands or issuing statements of
apology by the violators-police and investigators have not had to
follow this Shonenho provision that is supposed to protect the
271
juvenile offender.
In the 1981 Chibaken Kashiwa-sho case, when a detained
juvenile suspect asked to speak to an attorney, an investigator
responded by saying that "a child has no right to have an
attorney. " 2 72 In the 1991 Saitamaken Urawa-sho case, the police

264.

See id.

265. If a juvenile who is over the age of sixteen has committed a crime
punishable by death or imprisonment if it were an adult crime, he can enter the
adult criminal system at the discretion of the Family Court. See supra Part II.A.
The Osaka District Court sentenced this juvenile to eighteen years in prison.
JyukyusaiHikoku no Jitsumei/ShashinKeisai, supranote 260.
266. As of the date of publication, the juvenile's attorney had not decided
whether to appeal the Osaka High Court's ruling to the Japanese Supreme Court.
See High Court Voids Ruling on Juvenile's Anonymity, DAILY YOMIURI, Mar. 1, 2000,
available in 2000 WL 4643874.
267. See Ensuring Fair Rulings for Minors, supra note 52; see also ToYoJI
SAITOH,

SHONENHO

KENKYU:

TEKISEI

TETsuzuKi

To

GoHAN KYusAI

68

(1997)

[hereinafter SAITOH].
268.
note 2, at
269.
270.

See id.; see also SHONENHO, arts. 8, 41-42, reprinted in GOTO, supra
202, 209-10.
SHONENHO, art. 1, reprintedin GOTO, supra note 2, at 201.
See generally KODOMO NO JINKEN, supra note 34, at 30-82. See supra

Part IV.B.
271.
272.

See generally KODOMO NO JINKEN, supra note 34, at 30-82.
Id. at 42.
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273
denied a juvenile suspect's requests to see his parents.
Likewise in the Kobe case, neither the juvenile's parents nor
attorneys were able to attend police interrogation sessions. 2 7 4 In
fact, during the detention the juvenile never saw his parents, and
the lawyers' meetings with him were restricted. 275 In February
2000, the Japanese Supreme Court overturned the 1985 Soka
case because it highly doubted the reliability of the juveniles'
confessions,2 76 thus bringing into question the tactics used by
the police. These are but a few of the numerous examples of
violations of Article 1 by the police during the investigation stage.
Such acts by the police hardly can be said to be "contribut[ing] to
the wholesomeness" of the juvenile. 27 7 They also violate various
278
international standards of juvenile justice.

C. Ensuring That the Revisions Follow International
Standardsof Juvenile Justice
Despite all the criticism, Shonenho, as written, closely follows
the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice (U.N. Standard).2 79 Nevertheless, once again,
because of the lack of enforcement provisions, the way Shonenho
is being applied does not conform to such standards. If the LDP
proposals become law, there will be a greater need to ensure that
the standards are met.
273.
274.

See id. at 70.
See Does Japan'sJuvenile Law Give Criminals an Easy Ride?, supra

note 230.
275.
See Kobe Case Tests PublicPatience With Law, supra note 60. Because
all evidence was circumstantial, the police needed a confession from Shonen A to
prove the case. See Key Points of Kobe Family Court Ruling, supra note 249. A
handwriting analysis showed that it was not possible to determine whether the
note left by Jun's head was that of Shonen A. See KODOMO NO JINKEN, supranote
34, at 79. Nevertheless, in an attempt to get a confession, investigators lied to the
juvenile, saying that a handwriting analysis had clearly determined that the note
was written by him. See id- This prompted the juvenile to break down and
confess to committing the crime. See Key Points of Kobe Family Court Ruling,
supra note 249. Lying by police in order to prompt a confession has been
documented on numerous occasions in other investigations involving juvenile
suspects. See generally KODOMO NO JINKEN, supranote 34, at 30-82, 315-33.
Still in other juvenile investigations, police used physical force or violence to
get confessions. See id. Police and investigators also often harassed juvenile
suspects by asking a juvenile's sexual history when it had nothing to do with the
crime for which she was a suspect. See id. at 41.
276.
See Soka Jiken: Saikousai ga Ni-shin Hanketsu Hak, Shinri o
Sashimodoshi,MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Feb. 7, 2000.
277.
SHONENHO, art. 1, reprintedin GOTO, supranote 2, at 201.
278.
See UNITED NATIONS STANDARD MINIMUM RULES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, Part Two, art. 10, cl. 10.1, reprinted in KODOMO NO JINKEN,
supra note 34, at 299 [hereinafter U.N. STANDARD]; see also infra Part V.
279. U.N. STANDARD, reprinted in KODOMO NO JINKEN, supra note 34, at 296302.
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One of the fundamental principles of the U.N. Standard is
that the Member States, including Japan, should seek "to further
the well-being of the juvenile and her or his family."28 0 This
concept is embraced by Shonenho, as its purpose is to "promot[e]
2 81
the welfare and wholesomeness of the juvenile."
The U.N. Standard also guarantees
[blasic procedural safeguards such as the presumption of
innocence, the right to be notified of the charges, the right to
remain silent, the right to counsel, the right to the presence of a
parent or guardian, the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses and the right to appeal to a higher authority .... 282

There is also a provision in the U.N. Standard that forbids
the publication of any information "that may lead to the
identification of a juvenile offender."2 83 Nevertheless, because of
the lack of enforcement of Shonenho, and because of the recent
trend to publicize juvenile offenders and trials, the reality is that
the current Japanese juvenile system is not protecting these
fundamental rights. Incorporating the language of the above U.N.
Standard into Shonenho, along with an enforcement provision, for
example, will ensure that the juvenile suspected is truly protected
during the investigation stage.
As long as the provisions of Shonenho are followed closely,
certain rights, without being explicitly listed, are guaranteed for
juvenile offenders.
For example, an investigation and trial
conducted in a gentle and amicable atmosphere should inherently
ensure that the juvenile has the right to remain silent if he is not
ready to talk, or if he does not want to do so. Nevertheless,
because it is evident that Shonenho is not being upheld in many
situations, there needs to be additional protection afforded the
juveniles who are part of the system. Guaranteeing the above
U.N. Standard rights, for example, will be especially crucial if the
proposal to allow prosecutors to be a part of juvenile trials
passes.

VI. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that the implementation of the LDP proposals
will produce favorable results in the Japanese juvenile system.
The proposals will destroy the framework of Shonenho, a law that
has proven effective for the Japanese culture for over fifty years.

280.

Id.pt. l,art. l,cl. 1.1.

281.
SHONENHO, art. 1, reprintedin GOTO, supranote 2, at 201.
282.
U.N. STANDARD, pt. 1, art. 7, cl. 7.1, reprinted in KODOMO NO JINKEN,
supranote 34, at 300.
283.
Id. pt. 1, art. 8, cl. 8.2.
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The recent effort to reform Shonenho is short-sighted, reflecting
the lawmakers' desire to please a public that has been influenced
by sensational and even inaccurate media reports. The most
recent increase in juvenile crime may not even prove to be a
trend. It is clear that the incidence of murders and other serious
crimes is lower than when Shonenho was first enacted.
In fact, the root of much criticism, the protective element of
Shonenho, is not being enforced in many cases. Those who
should be enforcing the crucial protection provisions of Shonenho,
such as the police, are blatantly ignoring and violating them. In
this way, Shonenho may not be in practice the law it was designed
to be.
Shonenho, as written, was carefully designed to create a
system in which the juvenile offender can recognize his
wrongdoing, receive adequate counseling, and be trained and
reformed so that he can return to society. It is supposed to
protect the juvenile from the stigma of having committed a crime;
thus, the privacy provisions of Articles 61 and 22 are essential.
Critics lamented that there was not enough information on the
Kobe case; 2 8 4 the truth, however, was that too much information
was being released to the public about Shonen A. It is more
worthwhile to sacrifice the public's right to know in order to
protect the juvenile's identity, so that he may return to society
without the stigma of having been a juvenile offender.
The revision process of Shonenho should be approached with
more caution, mindful that it has proven effective over the last
fifty years. As one lawyer said, it would indeed be easy to provide
harsher punishments 2 8 5-that would be the simplest way to
appease the current public sentiment.
Yet the drafters of
Shonenho deliberately chose the more challenging but effective
way of focusing on helping and protecting the juvenile. For
286
Shonenho, punishment is the last resort.
Nevertheless, the proposals currently on the table emphasize
punishment as does the general public sentiment in Japan. The
proposals will only cause the system to deviate even further from
the vision and goals of Shonenho. They will not contribute to
more accurate fact-finding. Instead, they will prevent it, for both
the prosecutor and the three-judge panel will create an
intimidating atmosphere for the juvenile offender. Such additions
will also destroy the framework of Shonenho in which all the
players are on the same side.

284.

See, e.g., Taro Karasald, New Problems in Kobe Case Not Over, ASAHI
Oct. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14781368.
See... And DiscussionsContinue, supranote 10.
See GOTO, supranote 2, at 12.

EVENING NEWS,

285.
286.
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Shonenho will work only if carefully followed and enforced.
The main reform that should take place now is that of ensuring
enforcement. One way to ensure this is to create enforcement
provisions within Shonenho and to guarantee certain rights to
juvenile
offenders.
After these suggestions have
been
implemented, further reform may be necessary to reflect the
changing times and the increase of juvenile crime, if it truly
proves to be a trend. Shonenho's track record so far has shown
that Japan should wait a few more years, at least, before
implementing the kind of drastic reform that the nation is
currently contemplating.
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